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Critical infrastructure and facilities are central assets in modern societies, but their
impact on international disaster relief remains mostly associated with logistics chal-
lenges. The emerging literature on cascading disasters suggests the need to integrate
the nonlinearity of events in the analyses. This article investigates three case studies:
the 2002 floods in the Czech Republic, Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and the 2011
Tohoku earthquake, tsunami and Fukushima meltdown in Japan. We explore how the
failure of critical infrastructure can orient international disaster relief by shifting its
priorities during the response. We argue that critical infrastructure can influence aid
request and delivery, changing needs to address the cascades, and contain cascading
technology-based events. The conclusions propose remaining challenges with applying
our findings.
1. Introduction and background
In recent decades, technology and society havebecome more integrated than in any other period of
history. Growing interdependencies of technological
networks challenge the reliability of the systems and
have increased their vulnerability to large-scale cascad-
ing disruptions (Amin, 2002; Little, 2002). A determin-
ing role is attributed to ‘critical infrastructure’, or ‘CI’,
which concentrates the physical attributes, functions
and organizational elements of society (Alexander,
2013). The European Commission (EC, 2006) encour-
aged all member states to include in their programmes
the impact of CI disruptions in terms of scope, sever-
ity, population affected, economic losses, environmen-
tal effects, political effects, psychological effects and
public health consequences (EC, 2006, p. 7). However,
the definitions evolved over the years according to dif-
ferent national criteria and priorities, including not
only buildings but also services and cyber assets
(NATO, 2007). In comparing national legislation, the
word ‘infrastructure’ tends to include intangible assets
such as supply chains and emergency services (OECD,
2008). Meanwhile, the attribute ‘critical’ is used to
express the idea of being essential to economic and
social well-being, as well as to public safety and gov-
ernmental services. A similar meaning is taken by the
concept of ‘critical facilities’ (United Nations Interna-
tional Strategy on Disaster Reduction, 2009), which
has often been used synonymously in disaster
literature.
Although the concept of CI is rooted in work from
more than four decades ago, a rise of concern on the
possible effect of disruptions is reported since the
early 2000s. The need for strategies for CI protection
was pointed out by events such as the 2001 terrorist
attacks in the north-east USA; the 2004 tsunami in
the Indian Ocean; the terrorist attacks against public
transport in Madrid (2004), London (2005) and
Mumbai (2006); and Hurricane Katrina in the United
States in 2005 (EC, 2006, NATO, 2007). Two of those
episodes had strong implications for international
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disaster relief. The 2004 tsunami hit areas where criti-
cal infrastructure was under development, challenging
the deployment of emergency relief with the inade-
quate capacity of local CI (Egan, 2007). Hurricane
Katrina showed the potential consequences of full
infrastructural breakdowns in Western societies,
where relief resources were abundant but previous
compound failures were relatively rare (Boin &
McConnell, 2007). Since then, disaster management
has improved. It is now clear that the effective deliv-
ery of emergency goods depends on both the restora-
tion of damaged supply chains and the reactivation of
social nodes (Boin, Kelle & Whybark, 2010). CI such
as airports, schools, hospitals and telecommunications
is vital for emergency response and good practices
have been adopted to promote preparedness, mini-
mize damage and limit disruptions (Lindell, Prater &
Perry, 2007; Haddow, Bullock & Coppol, 2008, Tsu-
nami Global Lessons Learned Project, 2015). How-
ever, some contextual differences still exist.
The studies on CI and international relief are
mostly focused on humanitarian logistics in developing
countries, while it seems they are assumed to be a
problem of management in the other areas. On the
one hand, the impact of disasters on developing
regions is often magnified, for example, by poor con-
struction that presents physical constraints to actions
(Kovacs & Spens, 2007). On the other hand, it has
often been assumed that richer societies have the
capacity to deal with the material effects of disasters
on their own, and their lessons learned could be
mostly about managerial issues (McClintock, 2009).
Those very same regions are more subject to studies
that address CI interdependencies or possible cascad-
ing disruptions in vital services (Little, 2002; Luiijf,
Nieuwenhuijs, Van Klaver, Eeten & Cruz, 2009; Van
Eeten, Nieuwenhuijs, Luiijf, Klaver & Cruz, 2011).
Even when their implications for disaster management
are considered, the contributions tend to analyse the
effects of networked failures more than their implica-
tions for international operations (Berariu, Fikar, Gro-
nalt & Hirsch, 2015; Helbing, Ammoser & K€uhnert,
2006). Assuming the capacity of CI to affect emer-
gency management in terms of deployment and the
coordination of humanitarian relief, there are no clear
answers to how CI can orient the goods delivered by
international relief to developed countries. Moreover,
if they are seen as spaces that concentrate and gener-
ate vulnerabilities for all societies, then the traditional
focus on triggering hazards is revealed to be inade-
quate (D’Ercole & Metzger, 2009).
The perspective highlighted by Pescaroli and
Alexander (2015) suggests a relation between the dis-
ruption of critical infrastructure and the nonlinear
escalation of emergencies that distinguishes cascading.
This could be associated with the cross-scale
accumulation of vulnerabilities paths waiting to hap-
pen, more than with low probability, high-impact pro-
cesses (Pescaroli & Alexander, 2016). CI may act as
vectors of impact, interrupting the vital functions of
society and spreading breakdowns from one sector to
the other, but also concentrating in the roots of fail-
ures different levels of negative feedbacks, such as cor-
ruption or mismanagement. This approach suggests
identifying the nodes that are more likely to generate
secondary events, improving preparedness levels to
contain escalation of events (Pescaroli et al., 2016).
However, the relation between CI and cascading is far
from being integrated in multilevel strategies that
could modify the vulnerability paths, as in the case of
the EU Floods Directive where the attention is
focused on the trigger hazard, localized impacts and
limited time scale (Nones & Pescaroli, 2016).
Is there just a gap in crisis management systems,
or has the application of this concept the potential
to affect the international delivery of aid? In this
case, the lack of literature on how CI and cascading
could influence international relief suggests a prelimi-
nary step. The focus of this article aimed to address
two overlapping gaps in the current theory: 1) a
low comprehension of how CI could orient interna-
tional actions in developed countries in any aspect
different from logistics and 2) the missing evidence
about the relation of cascading disasters and CI with
the international delivery of emergency goods and
expertise.
Our hypothesis is that CI can become a main driver of
needs as the event progresses and this can be seen in a
shifting request for or offer of international aid. In other
words, we hypothesize that the escalation is visible in
the offer/request of specific goods or expertise that
could be related to CI disruptions. For example, a wide-
spread energy breakdown could require international
relief to supply more generators, while compromised
healthcare facilities could require the delivery of more
field hospitals. After a short overview of the methodol-
ogy adopted, our study will test this hypothesis with the
analysis of three case studies. A separate section will
draw a common picture of how critical infrastructure
orients and directs international relief. Conclusions will
indicate the implications of our research for practices
and scholars as well as its limitations.
2. Selection of case studies
In the following pages, we describe the 2002 floods in
the Czech Republic, Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and
the 2011 disaster in Japan. The selection of cases was
made according to the following criteria:
(1) The events were in line with the definition of cas-
cading disasters by Pescaroli et al. (2015). Namely,
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we intended them as ‘extreme events, in which
cascading effects increase in progression over time
and generate unexpected secondary events of
strong impact. These tend to be at least as serious
as the original event, and to contribute signifi-
cantly to the overall duration of the disaster’s
effects. These subsequent and unanticipated crises
can be exacerbated by the failure of physical
structures, and the social functions that depend
on them’ (Pescaroli et al., 2015, p. 65).
(2) Each event required a major commitment of inter-
national relief, but with different magnitudes.
(3) The events involved developed countries and pro-
vided an overview of different geographical areas
(North America, Central Europe and eastern
Asia).
(4) Primary data and secondary data had to be avail-
able to reflect the evolution of interstate relief
during the emergency phase. The sources had to
be reliable and allow a screening of the event in
progress.
The approach adopted is a qualitative comparison
of primary and secondary sources (King, Keohane &
Verba, 1994). First, we briefly describe each case
study. Second, we derive which CI was affected by the
disaster and which cascades were generated. Lastly,
we verify in the documentation which goods delivered
by international relief could be correlated with CI.
The main sources of data were the reports by the
NATO Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination
Centre (EADRCC) for both the 2002 floods and 2005
Hurricane Katrina, where the alliance was one of the
coordinators of emergency response. The reports by
the United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the EC were the
main sources for the 2011 event, which was not
reported by the EADRCC. The online website ‘Relief
Web’ (reliefweb.int) was used to cross-check informa-
tion with other official sources. The documents pro-
vided a daily description of the disasters and of
international relief, allowing the description of events
in progress.
In the analysis, we intended CI as asset or system
essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions
and the well-being of citizens. We used the categories
reported in the documentation by the UK Cabinet
Office (2011) to avoid the problems in the classifica-
tion (NATO, 2007, OECD, 2008). We referred to
nine essential sectors and four other types of CI, such
as food, energy, water, communications, transport,
health, emergency services, government, finance, civil
nuclear facilities, hazardous sites (e.g., chemicals); ico-
nic sites and companies of strategic value (UK Cabinet
Office, 2011). We associated ‘icon sites’ with ‘national
monuments’ as suggested by OECD (2008),
approaching them in the larger meaning of cultural
heritage to integrate community-based perspectives
(Alexander, 1993).
This short paper cannot be exhaustive or fully pre-
cise regarding all the resources deployed for each dis-
aster, but provides a first approach to an emerging
topic. Similarly, it does not mention what would have
happened if CI were not driving relief efforts and
leaves this topic to future studies. Four assumptions
are made based on the literature and experience with
large-scale disasters in Western societies, so they are
not subject to detailed analysis:
(1) The logistical chain and the deployment of emer-
gency response resources are affected by CI dis-
ruption. This assumes that international relief is
likely to provide mechanisms such as trucks,
planes and ships to deliver the aid.
(2) The disasters considered imply a full mobilization
of national resources which, for different reasons,
may have been overwhelmed.
(3) Goods such as medicine, blankets and medical
supplies are provided in international relief, as
well as expertise like healthcare professionals, and
search-and-rescue teams. Similarly, this is true also
for emergency grants.
(4) The discussion of political/managerial root causes
of CI disruption in each case study is reported in
the ad hoc literature. Thus, these case studies do
not analyse the impact of decision-making pro-
cesses on the cascade.
The limitations of our study are reported in the
conclusions where they are used to suggest new paths
for future research.
3. 2002 Floods in the Czech Republic
(Prague Metropolitan Area)
The August 2002 floods were a major cross-border
event that hit Central Europe. Sequential waves of
heavy rainfall occurred from 6 to 8 August 2002 and
from 11 to 14 August 2002, affecting mainly the
Czech Republic, Germany, Austria and Slovakia
(Ulbrich, Br€ucher, Fink, Leckebusch, Kr€uger & Pinto,
2003). In the Czech Republic, the event was labelled
as the largest recorded in history, causing 19 deaths
and affecting three point two million citizens (Hladny,
Kratka & Kasparek, 2004). Although the first sequence
of rainfall was contained, the capacity of the reservoirs
was saturated and the basins were unable to absorb
the second period of rainfall. The River Vltava sub-
merged parts of Prague, peaking on Wednesday 14
August. The same day, international assistance started
at different levels including the International Commu-
nity, the European Union and bilateral agreements
(Ekengren, Matzen, Rhinard & Svantesson, 2006). The
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event activated the implementation of European regu-
lations, such as the European Union Solidarity Fund
and the Flood Directive. The state of emergency
ended on 31 August, but the status of alarm remained
until 31 October for the precarious conditions pro-
duced by the flood.
3.1. Critical infrastructure and cascading effects
Critical infrastructure generated secondary emergen-
cies that required complex efforts to be contained
(Pescaroli et al., 2015). Some 124 wastewater treat-
ment plants were damaged increasing the levels of
organic pollution, while flooded industrial sites
released contaminants into the water supply (Hladny
et al., 2004). The risk of epidemics required massive
programmes of disinfection and vaccination against
hepatitis A, which were needed on 5 September, even
after the end of emergency status. Flooding of petrol
stations in Karlin contaminated drinking water (Risk
Management Solutions, Inc, 2003). Chlorine leaked
from the Spolana chemical plant in Neratovice, where
local residents were evacuated and the situation had
to be constantly monitored (NATO, 2002d).
Electricity, communication and transport infrastruc-
ture were heavily disrupted. This included electric and
gas supplies, strategic thoroughfares such as the high-
way from Prague to the German border, river crossing
points, rail transport and public transport such as
underground and coach stations (NATO, 2002b,
Chamra, 2006; United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme/GRID, 2002). Vital supplies were heavily
affected: electricity was fully restored in mid-Septem-
ber, gas in October and telephone services in Novem-
ber (Risk Management Solutions, Inc, 2003). However,
the attributes of Prague as an administrative and gov-
ernmental centre, and as a UNESCO World Heritage
Site, complicated further emergency management. The
involvement of public facilities included, for example,
the evacuation of hospitals in the city centre, while
four and a half kilometres of files was under water in
the City Court of Prague (United Nations Environ-
ment Programme/GRID, 2002). The high concentra-
tion of historical and cultural sites in the city centre
required that firefighters and volunteers were sent in
to limit the damage and protect critical assets such as
the Municipal Library of Prague, the Institute of
Archaeology and the Charles Bridge (Crosby, 2004).
3.2 How CI oriented international relief
The documentation shows an unequivocal relationship
among the subsidiary events related to CI disruptions
and the delivery of emergency goods (NATO, 2002a–
h). The early request of assistance was mainly associ-
ated with portable dryers, floating pumps and
submersible electric pumps, that is, dealing with the
physical impact of water (NATO, 2002a,b). From 18
August onwards, the Czech local emergency authority
added the request of vaccines against hepatitis A, chlo-
rine-based disinfectants, insect repellents and/or clean-
ing products (NATO, 2002c). International relief was
used to address health effects and contamination due
to the disruption of wastewater facilities and treat-
ment plants. After 19 August, the Spolana chemical
spills required a constant monitoring and the prepara-
tion of specialized units to deal with chemicals
(NATO, 2002b). The same day, NATO reported the
chlorine leakage and the Russian Federation offered
some generic technical assistance. International crisis
specialists from Canada examined the situation in the
Spolana chemical plant after chlorine contamination
(Agence France-Presse, 2002a,b).
The consequences of joint prolonged failures of CI
on drinking water caused further escalation of health
concerns on 22 August when the Czech Republic
added the urgent request for vaccines (NATO, 2002f).
In the same document, Sweden offered protective
clothing, cleaning and disinfectants. The next day, 23
August, the contamination of rivers and wastewaters
became a high-priority task and the Slovak Republic
added a mobile chemical laboratory (NATO, 2002g).
Five experts of land rehabilitation were also offered
by the United States, but it is uncertain if they may be
linked to Spolana and the overall water contamination
(NATO, 2002h).
Together with the cascading impacts on health
caused by water contamination, the Prague case study
is significant for the involvement of cultural and histor-
ical sites. Technical assistance for the restoration of
cultural heritage was offered by Italy and Spain as a
consequence of the damage to historical and cultural
heritage sites such as in the Prague city centre, the
Veltrusy Castle and the Terezin catacombs (NATO,
2002e–h). Although hospitals were flooded, the docu-
mentation does not reflect any consistent influence on
international aid. Similarly, the energy disruption was
not reflected in the documents: just a very modest
number of generators was provided (NATO, 2002b).
4. 2005 Hurricane Katrina in the United
States
Hurricane Katrina made landfall in Louisiana the
morning of 29 August 2005 and generated a storm
surge that propagated up the Mississippi River (United
States Senate, 2006). The hurricane continued north,
decreased into a tropical depression on 30 August and
dispersed on 31 August over the Eastern Great Lakes.
The damages extended over 144,840 square kilome-
tres with around 300,000 homes destroyed or made
uninhabitable (United States Senate, 2006). The impact
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of the hurricane and the surge together caused 1,833
estimated fatalities (Knabb, Rhome & Brown, 2011).
The emergency was distinguished by the need for a
fast scaling up of the response capacity, which was not
always possible and was revealed to be inadequate
given the magnitude of the crisis (Ansell, Boin & Kel-
ler, 2010). On 2 September, US President Bush
acknowledged as ‘not acceptable’ the management of
the emergency by the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA), mobilizing nearly 70,000 National
Guard members in two days and 7,200 active duty
forces on 3 September (Haddow et al. 2008). On 4
September 2005, the United States made an urgent
request for assistance to NATO allies through the
Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre.
Operations lasted until 2 October (NATO, 2005a–h).
Together with the NATO channel, emergency goods
and services were offered also from countries with
diplomatic difficulties with the United States, but their
reception was distinguished by inconsistency from the
US government (Kelman, 2007).
4.1 Critical infrastructure and cascading effects
Katrina wiped out some CI in New Orleans, Louisi-
ana, Mississippi and Alabama, raising cross-sector
emergencies and affecting recovery over both the
short and long term (Boin et al., 2007; Egan, 2007). It
was distinguished by a wide cascade of secondary
events that increased the pressure on national and
international relief, such as the destruction of vital
utility networks, diffused pollution and the loss of
other strategic assets in the area (Moynihan, 2009).
Problems were associated with the complexity of
assessing damage and coordinating the restoration of
CI (United States Senate, 2006). Energy facilities were
devastated, leaving some three million citizens without
electricity for up to several weeks (Knabb et al.,
2011).
Offshore infrastructure was damaged; oil and gas
production/refining in the Gulf of Mexico fell. The
hurricane caused at least 142 oil spills which piled
into the waterways (Haddow et al. 2008). Fuel short-
ages were the joint effect of the fall in refining capac-
ity and the lack of electricity needed to pump fuel
(United States Senate, 2006). Environmental and
health hazards were associated with the impact on
466 chemical facilities, 31 hazardous waste sites, 16
toxic waste sites, 170 drinking water facilities and
dozens of wastewater facilities (The White House,
2006).
Transport arteries such as highways and bridges
were compromised, reducing the capacity of respon-
ders to deliver food, water and medical supplies
(Moynihan, 2009). Communication was heavily
affected. Three million customers were without phone
lines and 1,477 cell towers and 38 emergency call cen-
tres were out of order (The White House, 2006).
Many Emergency Operation Centres were flooded or
damaged, limiting relief operations and the operational
capacity of the police in the New Orleans area
(Moynihan, 2009). Healthcare facilities were heavily
damaged or destroyed, leaving hundreds of patients
without basic supplies (The White House, 2006).
4.2 How CI oriented international relief
A substantial part of goods delivered by international
aid compensated for FEMA’s logistics failure, while
coordination problems could be attributed to an
absence of a preconceived scenario where the United
States could need foreign assistance in their territory
(Kelman, 2007, United States Senate, 2006, The White
House, 2006). Different countries such as Canada and
the Netherlands offered the support of naval vessels
and helicopters, but in this case it is not known
whether they could be associated with the logistic
delivery of goods, with the support of search-and-res-
cue activity or with the escalation of events (NATO,
2005a–h). However, a consistent part of international
relief in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina can be
seen without any doubt as the effect of cascades gen-
erated by CI disruption. On 4 September 2005, the
first international disaster assistance request of the
United States stated an urgent need for meals ready
to eat (MREs) to satisfy a critical shortfall; 70,000
MREs were provided by Germany alone on the first
day (NATO, 2005a). Less than twelve hours later, an
updated request included bottled water, water trucks,
energy generators, medical supplies, veterinary sup-
plies, shelters, plastic sheeting and logistics crews
(NATO, 2005b). Together with organizational failures
of FEMA, the fall of vital services affected homes and
shelters which were subject to extended power
outages, producing shortages of drinking water, run-
ning water and rations (United States Senate, 2006,
Haddow et al. 2008).
On 6 September, the offers made to the EADRCC
included chemical analysis teams, water treatment and
purification units, water clearing, disinfectants and
naval vessels (NATO, 2005c). Despite the massive dis-
ruption of healthcare facilities and the presence of
foreign medical teams and supplies, the number of
field hospitals remained marginal. From 7 and 8
September, the international offers started to focus on
technological support, power reestablishment teams,
chemical analysis/detection teams, hazardous waste
handling teams, counterpollution teams, decontamina-
tion teams, water purification units and chlorine
tablets (NATO, 2005d,e).
On 14 September, the US authorities confirmed
that MREs and external logistics personnel support
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were not needed anymore. Instead, they accepted the
delivery of three GSM (Global System for Mobile
Communications) network stations from Sweden and
11,200 chlorine tablets from Italy (NATO, 2005f),
which were needed due to the prolonged disruption
of communication and water infrastructure. The role
of telecommunication support organizations could
have been even broader in terms of NGOs or the pri-
vate sector as suggested by Kelman (2007). Moreover,
later offers from international allies included elements
such as high-power pontoons and lights (NATO,
2005g). It must be noted that the documentation
showed a significant divergence between the goods
offered by international relief and the goods accepted
by the US government (NATO, 2005a–h, EC, 2005).
5. 2011 Tohoku earthquake, tsunami
and Fukushima meltdown in Japan
At 05:46 (UTC) on 11 March 2011, an undersea
earthquake occurred 130 kilometres east–south-east
off the Oshika Peninsula along the coast of Tohoku,
Japan, with a registered nine (Mw) magnitude
(National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
2011). It triggered a devastating tsunami that hit the
Pacific side of the Tohoku Region and the northern
part of the Kanto Region, overtopping or destroying
the existing seawalls. Large areas were submerged and
entire villages washed away, while the water travelled
up to ten kilometres inland in Sendai (National Ocea-
nic and Atmospheric Administration, 2011). According
to the National Police Agency of Japan (2015), the
two episodes together caused 15,893 fatalities, 6,152
injuries and 2,572 people missing. 399,767 properties
were subject to total or partial collapse, and 747,055
buildings were partially damaged (National Police
Agency of Japan, 2015).
The emergency was amplified by a third event in the
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, located 262
kilometres from Tokyo. Here, the cascade impacted on
a precarious situation in the site and blocked the cool-
ing of reactors, leading to a full nuclear meltdown of the
highest severity: while the earthquake damaged the
electric substations and caused a loss of offsite electric-
ity, the tsunami destroyed emergency generators, sea-
water cooling pumps and electric wiring systems.
Despite the environmental triggers, the Japanese
authorities defined what happened in Fukushima as ‘a
profoundly manmade disaster’ that could have been
prevented (National Diet of Japan, 2012). As its direct
consequence, approximately 150,000 people were
evacuated and an estimated 1,800 square kilometres of
land in Fukushima Prefecture was contaminated by radi-
ation (National Diet of Japan, 2012). Together with
complex clean-up operations and major environmental
concerns, the disaster reinforced worldwide public
sentiment against nuclear power, for example, influenc-
ing heavily the policies in Germany and Italy (Acton &
Hibbs, 2012). The real consequences of the event in the
long term are still unclear.
5.1. Critical infrastructure and cascading effects
Japan experienced a full disruption of the CI in the area.
Government facilities, disaster management centres,
fire stations and ports were destroyed by tsunami
waves. In the aftermath, hospitals were reported to be
without water, gas and electricity, leading to major con-
cerns about patients. Around 4.4 million households
were left without electricity and one and a half million
were without water (Tsunami Global Lessons Learned
Project, 2015). At least 25 power stations were shut
down, while 195 drainage systems and 72 sewage treat-
ment works were damaged (Kazamaa & Nodab, 2012).
CI disruption hampered operations, with problems
including debris on roads, fuel shortages and the lack of
communication lines (OCHA, 2011a–i).
Japan’s disaster damaged 4,198 roads, 116 bridges
and 29 railway lines, causing also 207 landslides and 45
dike breaks (National Police Agency of Japan, 2015).
The strategic north–south route on the Pacific coast
(National Route 45) was damaged by the tsunami, get-
ting more difficult to ensure transport in the area (Kaza-
maa et al., 2012). Japanese refinery capacity fell 30 per
cent and the general loss of power generated cascading
disruptions in rail transport, manufacturing, potable
water supplies and gasoline supplies (McGee, Frittman,
Ahn & Murray, 2014). Communications were disrupted
by the joint effect of lack of power supply, communica-
tion buildings damaged or flooded by the tsunami, as
well as relay networks and undersea cables severed. In
the early aftermath, around one and a half million lines
were interrupted and the Nippon Telegraph and Tele-
phone Corporation restricted 90 per cent of mobile
phone service to allow emergency communications
among responders (McGee et al., 2014).
Together with the joint effect of the earthquake and
tsunami, the Fukushima disaster can be seen as a dri-
ver of the cascading path driven by CI (Pescaroli et al.,
2015). The government declared a state of ‘Atomic
Power Emergency’ (OCHA, 2011a,b), which had
effects both in terms of damage (contamination) and
in terms of emergency challenges (displacement and
security of citizens). It has been argued that the com-
plete remediation of the site will take decades, with
challenges associated with removing melted fuel and
the recovery process (Acton et al., 2012).
5.2 How CI oriented international relief
Japan’s disaster of March 2011 hit one of the most
prepared and organized countries in the world, whose
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culture was not oriented towards receiving interna-
tional aid (ICF Consulting Service, 2014). At the end
of the month, Japan had received 134 offers from
countries and 39 from international organizations,
accepting relief items just from 29 of them (OCHA,
2011g). In the early aftermath search-and-rescue
teams, medical supplies, common emergency goods
(e.g., blankets), and special units such as for WASH
were accepted (OCHA, 2011a–i). The US military
based in Japan heavily supported the delivery of aid
and the restoration of CI in ports and airports,
deploying around 18,000 personnel together with
ships, aircrafts and helicopters in ‘Operation Tomoda-
chi’ (OCHA, 2011a–i, United States Government,
2011b). Much of the international relief received for
the 11 March disaster can be linked to CI disruptions,
including delivery of food supplies, bottles of water,
water tanks, emergency lights and lanterns, generators
and body warmers, fuel, liquid natural gas, gasoline
and rubber gloves (OCHA, 2011a–i, Government of
Japan, 2011b).
OCHA reported that fuel shortage was ‘still the big-
gest obstacle to delivering relief supplies and keeping
people warm’ on 25 March (OCHA, 2011h). As a
consequence, in early April, the People’s Republic of
China delivered 10,000 metric tons of gasoline and
10,000 metric tons of diesel (Government of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China, 2011). OCHA reports also list
communications support, with the deployment of more
than 37 broadband global area network terminals by the
International Telecommunication Union (OCHA, 2011d)
and Telecoms Sans Frontieres (OCHA, 2011a,b).
The Fukushima meltdown was another key driver
of the action, and the uncertainties about contamina-
tion oriented international relief at different levels.
The situation influenced the procedures of the EC
from the beginning, when ‘additional personal protec-
tive equipment and medical checks’ were required for
the teams in charge of needs assessments (ICF Con-
sulting Service, 2014). The meltdown also required
the mobilization of particular skills, expertise and sup-
ply. Two reactor experts from the US Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission (NRC) were deployed on 12 March
(OCHA, 2011b), but their number was soon raised to
nine additional units with different expertise (United
States Government, 2011a). In a later phase, the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency was involved in assess-
ing the power plant and food safety (OCHA, 2011i).
When relief goods are considered, Fukushima drove
the international relief in particular between the end
of March and early April. Canada provided 150 porta-
ble radiation survey meters, readers for dosimeters
and 5,000 personal dosimeters (Government of
Canada, 2011, Government of Japan, 2011b). Another
400 dosimeters and 5,000 masks were provided by
Russia, and some other smaller contribution was given
by the Republic of Korea (Government of Japan,
2011b). The EU member states provided through the
civil protection machinery around 100,000 paper
masks, dosimeters, radiological detectors, protective
suits and gloves and a radiation measurement vehicle
(European Commission, 2011; Government of Japan,
2011b). Two barges from the US military carried fresh
water to assist in the cooling down operations at the
nuclear power plant (OCHA, 2011g). Moreover, the
United States contributed three semiconductor detec-
tors, 33,000 dosimeters, 99 protective body armours
against nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and 9
metric tons of boric acid (Government of Japan,
2011b). A C17 aircraft carried a special pump from
Australia to cool the nuclear power plant (Govern-
ment of Japan, 2011a). The long-lasting pattern of this
crisis can be associated with the 1,000 radiation sur-
vey meters, 1,000 personal radiation dosimeters,
1,000 protective masks and filters received from
Ukraine on 4 August (Government of Japan, 2011b).
The US Marines Chemical and Biological Incident
Response Force (C-BIRF) was deployed to provide
emergency training to the Japanese Self Defense
Forces (SDF) operating in the Fukushima area
(Feickert & Chanlett-Avery, 2011).
6. How CI orients international disas-
ter relief in cascading disasters
Our case studies demonstrated that, in cascading dis-
asters, CI can orient the actions of international disas-
ter relief in many ways different from the process of
logistics delivery alone. Even if every disaster has
unique aspects, our data suggest the existence of
some recurrent and overlapping paths that associated
the escalation of events with CI disruption and the
progressive changes in relief. This evidence is dis-
cussed in the following paragraphs, and Table 1 pre-
sents an overview and synthesis of the case studies.
6.1. Direct effect: CI as functional nodes
The first point to consider is that CI can influence
international relief in being functional nodes, meaning
the physical places where the services and assets that
are vital for society are concentrated (Alexander,
2013; Ansell et al., 2010; Boin et al., 2007; D’Ercole
et al., 2009). This element is well known in the litera-
ture, but our cases provide more evidence. We veri-
fied that the disruption of energy and communication
can be the main drivers of cascading failures, as effec-
tively demonstrated by some authors (Luiijf et al.,
2009; Van Eeten et al., 2011). CI interdependencies
heavily affect emergency response (Berariu et al.,
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2015; Tsunami Global Lessons Learned Project, 2015);
however, despite the loss of services and assets that is
commonly described as direct effects of extreme
events on CI (Alexander, 2013), their consequences
for international relief must be seen as effects of
cross-sector disruption that struck primarily food and
water supplies. Excluding Prague, a massive mobiliza-
tion of MREs, water bottles and water tanks was
observed. Although it could be expected that
extended energy shortages could be associated with
the delivery of substantial amounts of generators, this
seems less relevant than expected. Generators are
present in all the documentation, but their amount is
not proportionate to the magnitude of the disruption,
while it is possible to observe items such as individual
heating supply or torches. Similarly, the deployment of
teams for the restoration of communication networks
has been reported, but in moderate amounts com-
pared to the loss of services. The presence of gasoline
and diesel is reported in Japan, while in Katrina, oil
offers were linked to bilateral agreements and diplo-
matic discussions (Kelman, 2007).
Although the accessibility of airports and roads ori-
ented the deployment of international relief as
assumed, the role of transport infrastructure is less
defined. In Japan, the ordinary logistical efforts hap-
pened together with the ‘restoration of critical infras-
tructure, such as damaged airfields, in order to sustain
operations’ (Feickert et al., 2011, p. 4). This was made
by the US army, which contributed to the restoration
Table 1. Overview of How CI Oriented International Disaster Relief in Our Case Studies
Case CI involved Cascading effects International relief
2002 floods Spolana chemical
plant
Contamination of
environment and the
potential effect on health
Specialized personnel, experts on land
rehabilitation
Water sector Contamination of
environment and the
effects on health
Vaccines, chlorine-based disinfectants,
cleaning products, protective
clothing, mobile chemical laboratory,
experts on land rehabilitation
Icons and
monuments
Intangible effects on the
community
Specialized personnel on the
restoration of cultural heritage
2005 Katrina Energy sector Social disruption and
cascading effects on others
sectors (e.g., water)
Energy generators, power restoration
teams, high-power pontoons, lights,
meals ready to eat (MREs)
Water sector Social disruption Bottled water, water trucks
Water sector and
hazardous sites
Contamination of
environment and the
potential effects on health
Chemical analysis teams, water
treatment and purification units,
water clearing, disinfectants,
chemical analysis/detection teams,
hazardous waste handling teams,
counterpollution and
decontamination teams, water
purification units, chlorine tablets
ICT sector Social disruption GSM network stations, technological
support
2011 Japan Fukushima nuclear
plant
Heavy contamination of
environment, the effects
on health and on global
politics
Radiation survey meters, readers for
dosimeters, personal dosimeters,
masks, radiological detectors,
protective suits and gloves, a
radiation measurement vehicle,
water barges, semiconductor
detectors, body armour, pumps,
filters, CNBR training, nuclear
experts
Energy sector Social disruption and
cascading effects on others
sectors such as water CI.
Food supplies, emergency lights and
lanterns, generators and body
warmers, fuel, liquid natural gas,
gasoline, diesel
Water sector Social disruption Bottles of water, water tanks
Transport sector Social disruption, emergency
services
Full mobilization of US army, with
tools and expertise
ICT sector Social disruption Broadband global area network
terminals
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of strategic transport lanes to allow the transit of sup-
ply and to limit secondary emergencies. However, it
cannot be expected that those circumstances would
be common. According to Feickert et al. (2011, p. 1),
‘the situation was unique in that U.S. forces and asso-
ciated resources were located in close proximity to
deal with the crisis’, while the US army was training
regularly with the SDF on disaster relief exercises.
The armed forces were able to mobilize trained corps
that could act on transport infrastructure, such as or
heavy vehicles, but those were already in the field and
were deployed according to pre-existing bilateral
agreements.
6.2. Indirect effect: CI as self-standing hazards
Despite CI disruptions commonly being associated
with the loss of services, our data show the existence
of further patterns. It is evident that some sites, such
as nuclear power plants, wastewater facilities and
industrial facilities, if damaged or disrupted during
extreme events can generate indirect effects like envi-
ronmental pollution or contamination (Alexander,
2013). After a triggering event, their attribute of self-
standing hazards is often revealed: while the functional
capacity of the CI in terms of providing materials and
services falls, the very same hazardous components or
materials that are used in the production process may
be released, originating cascades.
In our cases, the international assistance consis-
tently provided expertise or goods to contain the
escalation due to the malicious effects of the CI itself.
This idea does not contradict the possibility that some
escalation is generated by cross-sectorial interdepen-
dencies (e.g., electricity failing that stops water
pumps). Instead, it integrates the evidence that vulner-
able equipment and materials like storage tanks, pipeli-
nes and paperwork can generate secondary disasters
after some environmental triggers (Helbing et al.,
2006; Krausmann, Renni, Campedel & Cozzani, 2011).
This is observed in the offer of or request for emer-
gency supplies such as purification units, chlorine
tablets, vaccines and dosimeters but also in expertise
or specialized training to deal with what are generally
known as chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
(CBRN) hazards.
Some particular considerations emerge from the
analysis of Katrina. In the EADRCC official documen-
tation (NATO, 2005a–h), a significant divergence can
be seen between the goods offered and the goods
accepted, which is a common procedure in major
emergencies (e.g., OCHA, 2011a–i). However, the
international offers in Katrina are much more ori-
ented to tackle the secondary disasters in term of
pollution or contamination, than the official request
made by the US government. This pattern was not
verified in the other documentation and suggests the
need of further research to understand any
recurrence.
6.3. Intangible effects: CI as historical and cul-
tural heritage
Finally, our discussion must consider the existence of
intangible effects on society, intended as those that
are not strictly measurable in monetary terms but
may influence choices and behaviour. They include
possible impacts on cultural heritage, associated with
national monuments and iconic archaeological sites
(Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2013,
Lazari, 2014). In our cases, the impact on heritage can
be seen in the Prague floods when Italy and Spain
offered specific expertise for the restoration of relics.
This followed a mobilization to protect sites such as
the Charles Bridge and the Institute of Archaeology.
However, no other evidence was found and the con-
sistency of this relation suggests the need for future
research.
Literature suggests that, in the past, only very rarely
has disaster assistance included assets to preserve and
restore historic and cultural heritage, even if it was
recognized as an important issue (Jones, 1986). For
Katrina, contextual differences are too strong to sup-
port a true comparison. Prague’s historic centre is a
UNESCO World Heritage Site and the flood involved
unique treasures for humanity dated back to the med-
ieval period, while in the most affected area of the
United States there was nothing similar, despite New
Orleans’ internationally renowned culture seen partic-
ularly through cuisine, language and music (Gotham,
2007; McKinney, 2006).
The Japan case is more complex. Although no
UNESCO World Heritage Site was heavily affected,
744 national landmarks were damaged in 19 prefec-
tures, including 6 special historic sites, 90 historic sites
and 16 natural monuments (Agency for Cultural
Affairs, 2012). Among the documents considered, no
international relief efforts referred to them. First, per-
haps the magnitudes of the disasters were different,
and in Japan, the cultural heritage might have come
after the need to contain loss of life and support sur-
vivors. Second, some cultural differences in the com-
munities could influence the relation with buildings,
landmarks and the environment (Alexander, 1993).
Last, it is possible that the type of heritage involved
was different in quality and quantity, requiring a higher
level of expertise in Prague. For example, the flood in
Prague’s National Library involved rare books dating
back to the fifteenth century and was compared with
the 1966 flood in Florence, when world-renowned
museums, including the Uffizi Gallery, were devastated
(Ray, 2006).
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7. Conclusions
Our analysis verified that critical infrastructure can ori-
ent the request for and offers of international disaster
relief in developed countries, shifting priorities as the
events progress. In our cases, some major efforts in
terms of goods and expertise are provided not only for
the response to the primary triggers (flood, hurricane,
earthquake, tsunami) but also to contain the escalation
of secondary events and CI disruptions. Three overlap-
ping paths have been pointed out (Figure 1):
• Direct effects due to the disruption of CI as func-
tional nodes, associated with recurrent conse-
quences on food, water and energy supplies;
• Indirect effects due to the potential of CI as self-
standing hazards, associated with the needed goods
and expertise used to tackle technological events;
• Intangible effects related to historical and cultural
heritage.
Those findings seem to support and extend the
existing theories on cascading dynamics and net-
worked events with evidence for international relief
(Helbing et al., 2006; Pescaroli et al., 2015, 2016). The
key recommendation is that international disaster
response should not focus just on primary triggers.
Instead, the structure of international disaster relief
should acknowledge that a consistent part of its
provision of goods and services is used to limit,
address and prevent the escalation due to the role of
CI in cascading disasters. The development of some
systematic databases could be of use to understand
better the recurrent gaps in national capacities and to
support faster deployment.
The evidence we presented has many limitations. We
recognize that some integration with quantitative analy-
sis methods such as data mining techniques could be
desirable in future. The availability of primary and sec-
ondary online sources could be used to create new data
sets, for example, correlating the effects of CI disrup-
tion, the countries involved, the types of triggers and
the secondary events. The first point for further testing
is where and when the role of international relief
becomes a condition sine qua non to limit the cascade
associated with CI. Is there any threshold that could be
common between the delivery of emergency goods,
such as MREs, and expertise, such as CNBR teams?
What about historical and cultural heritage as CI? Are
they effectively part of an escalation process? Is there
any consistency in the offer of or request for aid?
Which actors provide which resources?
Similarly, further studies should address the contri-
butions of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
and the private sector in defining how and where they
are more likely to exceed state-driven support. For
example, the NGO Telecoms Sans Frontieres sent
teams to provide emergency communication
Indirect effect: self- standing hazards
e.g., Nuclear plant-> Contamination->
CBRN training anddosimeters
Direct effect: functional nodes
e.g., Power plant -> Lackof energy
supply-> MREsandwater
Intangible effects: icons and heritage
e.g., Museum->Relics->Restorers
Disruption of CI
Trigger Event
Request/Offer of
International
Relief
National response capacity
is overwhelmed
Cascading escalation of
secondary events
Figure 1. Schematic overview of how CI orients international disaster relief in cascading disasters. The dashed arrow suggests the need of
further testing for icons and heritage.
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assistance both in Katrina and in Japan (Kelman, 2007;
OCHA, 2011a). Bilateral offers could relate CI disrup-
tion to ‘disaster diplomacy’ issues (Kelman, 2007), in
particular related to supplies like oil or to military
resources such as engineers and amphibious vehicles.
Many questions remain on how transport infrastruc-
ture could orient international relief in cascading.
Despite the common logistic challenges, there could
be other drivers such as expertise or tools that need
to be addressed with problem trees and considera-
tions about diplomatic affairs.
A final but critical point that should be addressed in
future is the differentiation between accepted and
offered relief. Priority should be given to understand-
ing the differences in national and international
response related to cascading events, and the drivers
of decision-making process. We recognize the need
for testing and improving our evidence with in-depth
incident evolution analysis and problem trees that
could explain the relationships between roots of cas-
cades and reflections on the delivery of goods and ser-
vices. What if CI disruptions in cascading events could
orient international relief more as a perceived escala-
tion threat than as a real field need? Which could be
the principal drivers in the decision-making processes?
These questions remain open, but their relevance is
unequivocal. The CI systems that are the backbone of
our society are also potentially its Achilles’ heel.
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